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INTRODUCTION 
 
On the 23rd of June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European 
Union (EU) after forty-three years of membership. This represents an historical 
moment given that it is the first time that the bloc, after decades of expansion, is 
formally facing the loss of one of its largest members.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to explain the lengthy and complex process of 
Brexit from both an historical and a procedural point of view, as well as to address the 
possible consequences that have been put on the table after Theresa May formally 
triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in late March 2017.  
 
First of all, this paper sets out that Brexit is the result of the traditional 
unenthusiastic and uninclined British tendency towards the European political 
integration project, which had its origins in the very first UK negotiations to take part 
in the European Economic Community (EEC) and which continued with the 
celebration of the first referendum on the UK membership of the European 
Community.  
 
Secondly, it summarises and analyses briefly the procedure for a country to 
withdraw from the European Union, as established by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
and its interpretation by the UK Supreme Court due to the extraordinary case of the 
United Kingdom, a country regulated by an unwritten constitution. Particularly 
relevant in this regard is the fact that Brexit has raised the very significant issue of the 
limits of the executive powers in Britain. Moreover, the fact that Theresa May 
officially invoked Article 50 was soon followed by the response of the European 
Union, providing its guidelines and core principles for negotiations.   
 
Thirdly, some of the most significant expected effects of Brexit on the economy, 
the law, politics and institutions will be outlined. This paper looks into the steps taken, 
or to be taken, both by the United Kingdom and by the European Union and into how 
matters may evolve in the following time. It provides, in broad terms, the possibilities 
for a future association between the Union and its departing member and, finally, the 
consequences that the departure of a large Member State like the United Kingdom may 
entail for the rest of the policies of the Union and for the Union itself.  
 
At last, the methodology that will be used in order to do so is based on a set of 
resources, including articles, books, legislation, case law, conclusions of the European 
Council, EU legal acts, legislation, political statements, UK political manifestos, press 
sources, statistical data, white papers of both the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, the opinion of some of the most relevant experts in Brexit and Internet sources.  
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1.  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM’S  PARTICULAR  APPROACH  WITH  
REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT 
 
The United Kingdom’s  demand   for  a  special   status   in  the  European  Union   is  not  
something new. Neither is the holding of a referendum on the United Kingdom's 
membership of the Union. Since the creation of the European Economic Community in 
1958, the British have remained ambivalent towards their Community partners and 
have often been distant from the European integration project.  
 
1.1 The breakdown of the United  Kingdom’s  negotiations  to  integrate 
in the European Economic Community 
 
In 1955, the six states which were participating in the elaboration of the Treaty of 
Rome (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), officially 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC), invited the 
United Kingdom to join them. The aim of this Treaty was economic integration: it was 
intended to create a common market based on a customs union with an external tariff 
for third countries and common policies among its Member States.1  
 
The Treaty of Rome did not directly mention political integration but it is quite 
impossible to separate economics from politics in this context. Governments are by 
their nature political and decisions on economic matters cannot be made without 
taking political considerations into account.2 In this sense, the founding fathers of the 
TEEC were aware of this idea and stated in its Preamble  that  they  ‘were determined to 
lay the foundations of an ever closer union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe’.  
 
However, the United Kingdom refused to participate in the creation of the 
European Economic Community for different reasons. It thought that a common 
market based on a customs union with an external tariff could harm its privileged 
trading position in the sterling zone and with the Commonwealth.3 In addition, Britain 
was reluctant to the idea of political integration,   as   it   did   not  want   to   ‘embark on a 
project whose long-term aim was to surrender its sovereignty as a national state to 
supranational European institutions’.4 
 
Britain not only opposed to become a member of the European Economic 
Community but it proposed the foundation of the European Free Trade Association 
                                                        
1 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed in Rome on the 25th of March 1957 
and in force since the 1st of January 1958.  
2 Watts, D. and Pilkington, C. (2005). Britain in the European Union Today: Third Edition. Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, p. 22.  
3 The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental organisation that is mostly integrated by former territories 
of the British Empire. Notably, the United Kingdom was the only European Member of the 
Commonwealth by the year 1955; Wilkes, G. (2001). The Commonwealth in British European Policy: 
Politics and Sentiment. In May, A. (ed.), Britain, The Commonwealth and Europe: The 
Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to Join the European Communities. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 53-81.  
4 Watts, D. and Pilkington, C., op. cit. 2, p. 115.  
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(EFTA) in 1960. 5  Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Portugal 
joined that new organisation, which constituted a mere free trade area and did not 
foresee any project of political integration.  
 
With the absence of the United Kingdom, the Treaty of Rome was signed by its 
six original members in 1957. As a matter of fact, the TEEC certainly created a 
common market based on a customs union among its members (although it meant 
exclusively free circulation of goods in practice),6 it developed common policies such 
as the ones related to transport and agriculture and it designed an institutional aparatus 
which still exists today: the European Commission, the European Assembly (later 
known as European Parliament), the Court of Justice and the Economic and Social 
Committee, thus making a great advance in building Europe.7  
 
Shortly after, the United Kingdom realised its mistake. Whereas the European 
Economic Community experimented a spectacular economic growth, Britain 
maintained its downward trend in relation to the Community.8  
 
1.2 De  Gaulle’s  double  veto  to  the UK application to join the EEC 
 
In August 1961 the Conservative Government of Harold Macmillan requested the 
beginning of negotiations on the accession to the European Economic Community. 
Nonetheless, after starting negotiations, the President Charles de Gaulle vetoed this 
accession in 1963.9 The French leader reasoned that the British would be reluctant to 
lose some of their preferences concerning trade with the Commonwealth and this 
would not only be problematic for the United Kingdom but also for other Member 
States: 
 
‘England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her 
exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most 
distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, 
and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and 
very original  habits  and  traditions’.10  
 
Although it may be thought that he was just describing the British national 
character, De Gaulle also explained the main reason why he opposed to such entry: if 
the British economy depended on the Commonwealth and the United States for much                                                         
5 Campos, N. and Coricelli, F. (2015). Why did Britain join the EU? A new insight from economic 
history. Retrieved 9 February 2017 at http://voxeu.org/article/britain-s-eu-membership-new-insight-
economic-history 
6 Free movement of persons, capitals and services continued to be subject to numerous limitations. It 
was necessary to wait until the Single European Act in 1987, when a definitive boost was given in order 
to establish a genuine unified market. This brought about the Treaty on European Union in 1992. 
7 Op. cit. 1.  
8 Campos, N. and Coricelli, F., op. cit. 5.  
9 Kandiah, M. D. and Staerk, G. (2001). Commonwealth International Financial Arrangements and 
Britain’s  First Application to Join the EEC in May, A. (ed.), Britain, The Commonwealth and Europe: 
The Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to Join the European Communities. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 111-131. 
10 President   Charles   de  Gaulle’s   press   conference   in   Paris   on   the   14th of January 1963. Retrieved 10 
February 2017 at http://aei.pitt.edu/5777/ 
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of its trade, what would be the benefits for the European Economic Community if the 
United Kingdom was admitted? By words of De Gaulle:  
 
‘The question…[is] whether Great Britain can now place herself like the 
Continent and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce 
all Commonwealth preferences, to cease any pretence that her agriculture be 
privileged, and, more than that, to treat her engagements with other countries of 
the free trade area as null and void — that question is the whole question’.11 
 
When the British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson again requested to join 
the European Economic Community in 1967, De Gaulle once more banned the 
accession of Britain.12 
 
1.3 Once it gets in, the United Kingdom still doubts whether to remain 
in the European Communities: the first referendum 
 
With  De  Gaulle’s  resignation  in  1969,  the  United  Kingdom  had  the  doors  opened  
to join the European Economic Community. Under the Conservative Government of 
Edward Heath, the British Parliament passed an act in 1971 which legislated for the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities (EC)13: the European 
Communities Act.  
 
From   the   first   moment,   Britain’s   partners   accused   the   United   Kingdom   of  
maintaining a distant and obstructionist attitude. And the increasingly divergent views 
held by different sections of the British society on the advantages and disadvantages of 
this membership were aggravated. Within this context, the new Labour Government of 
Harold Wilson, elected in October 1974, pledged to immediately renegotiate the 
conditions of adhesion to the European Communities.14  
 
The Labour Party had always feared the consequences of being in the common 
market, such as the difference regarding the prices of food under the European 
Common Agricultural Policy and the Commonwealth markets, much lower than the 
European ones, as well as the loss of economic sovereignty. Leaders of the Labour 
Government had also put forward the argument that the Conservatives had negotiated 
unfavourable terms for Britain in the Labour’s  manifesto  for  the  October  1974  general  
election.15 
                                                         
11 Ibid.  
12  Alexander, P. R. (2001). The Labour Government, Commonwealth Policy, and the Second 
Application to Join the EEC in May, A. (ed.), Britain, The Commonwealth and Europe: The 
Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to Join the European Communities. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 132-155. 
13 The European Communities was the collective term for the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the Common Market or the Single 
Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). All three of these institutions would 
later form part of what is now known as the European Union.   
14 Miller, V. (2015). The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum. Retrieved 
11 February 2017 at http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7253 
15 The Labour Party (1974). Britain will win with Labour: Labour Party Manifesto: October, 1974. 
Retrieved 11 February 2017 at http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab74oct.htm  
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In order to make conditions more favourable to Britain, Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson demanded the European Communities to reduce the British contribution to the 
Community budget. The Heads of Government of the EC Member States agreed to the 
British pretension in the Summit of Dublin celebrated on the 11st of March 1975.16 
However, Wilson was not totally   satisfied   with   the   result:   ‘I believe that our 
renegotiation objectives have been substantially though not completely achieved’.17  
 
Moreover, the Labour’s   manifesto   for   the   October   1974   general   election   had  
promised that if the Labour Party  won,  people  would  decide   ‘through the ballot box’ 
whether Britain should stay in the European Communities on the new terms.18 In the 
same sense, the White Paper of the 26th of  February  1975,   ‘The Referendum on UK 
Membership of the European Communities’ 19, announced that a referendum would be 
held after the outcome of the renegotiation was known. 
 
The referendum took place on the 5th of June 1975, and both the Labour Party and 
the new elected leader of the Conservative Party Margaret Thatcher openly 
recommended voting in favour of the continued membership on the basis that 
remaining in Europe will provide the United Kingdom with new trade opportunities, as 
British companies would have tariff-free access to the expanding European markets.20 
 
The referendum result was not legally binding due to the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 21  However, as a matter of fact, it was widely known that the final 
outcome would be accepted by the Government, as Prime Minister Harold Wilson had 
stated   in   a   pamphlet:   ‘I ask you to use your vote. For it is your vote that will now 
decide. The Government will accept your verdict’.22  
 
This was the first referendum in the United Kingdom. In total, over two-thirds of 
voters (67.2%) supported the continuation in the European Communities and only 
32.8% voted against the continued membership.23 
 
1.4 Britain’s  privileges over the other Community Members 
 
As Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in May 1979, she relaunched the 
campaign to reduce the contribution of the United Kingdom to the Community budget                                                         
16 Council of the European Union (1975). European Council conclusions, 10-11 March 1975.  Retrieved 
11 February 2017 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1992-1975/ 
17 Prime  Minister  Harold  Wilson’s  statement  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the18th of March 1975; HC Deb 
18 March 1975 cc1456-80. 
18 The Labour Party, op. cit. 15.  
19 UK Government (1975). The Referendum on UK Membership of the European Community, White 
Paper, Cm 5925. Retrieved 11 February 2017 at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7253#fullreport 
20 Williamson, A. (2015). The case for Brexit: lessons from the 1960s and 1970s. Retrieved 11 February 
2017 at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/the-case-for-brexit-lessons-from-1960s-
and-1970s  
21 It is a principle of the UK constitution that makes Parliament the supreme legal authority in Britain, 
which can enact or repeal any law. In order to hold a referendum, an act of the Parliament is required.  
22 Labour Government’s   pamphlet   advocating a vote to   stay   in   the   ‘European Community (Common 
Market)’ in the 1975 British Referendum on continuing British membership. Retrieved 11 February 
2017 at http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro/pamphlet.htm 
23 Miller, V. (2015), op. cit. 14.  
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because she was not satisfied with the outcome of the renegotiation carried out by the 
Labour leader Harold Wilson. Like Wilson, Thatcher complained that the vast majority 
of aid went to farmers,24 and this barely benefited the British due to the fact that the 
United Kingdom had a small agricultural sector. In this regard, at the Dublin Summit 
of November 197925 Thatcher delivered one of  her  most  famous  sentences:  ‘I  want  my  
money  back!’ 
 
The conflict was not resolved until the Summit of Fontainebleau in June 198426, 
when Britain achieved the famous UK rebate, a financial mechanism that reduced the 
United Kingdom's contribution to the Community budget since 198527 and that has 
continued up to the present day.  
 
The UK rebate was just the first special measure of United Kingdom, out of many 
others. Since then, Britain began to design its own Europe à la carte, and avoided 
participating in policies in which it had not any substantial interest.  
 
For example, during the negotiation of the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU), signed in 1992 in order to create the European 
Union and to establish the single European currency (the euro), British Prime Minister 
John Major negotiated an opt-out from28 this single currency and from the social 
policy, in the same way that Denmark did.29 Both countries maintained their local 
currencies.  
 
Moreover, the United Kingdom and Ireland were the only two European countries 
that opted out from the Schengen borderless area when this was incorporated into EU 
legislation by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The main point of the Schengen rules 
was to abolish border checks between the participating Member States in order to 
accelerate the movement of people and goods, with external border controls for 
travellers entering and exiting the area and common visas, but with no internal border 
controls.30 The United Kingdom, however, wished to maintain its own borders and 
Ireland preferred to preserve its free movement arrangement with Britain, called the 
Common Travel Area.31  
                                                         
24 In fact, around 70% of the European Budget was used to finance the Common Agricultural Policy; 
European Union (2012). The Common Agricultural Policy: A story to be continued. Retrieved 11 
February 2017 at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/50-years-of-cap/files/history/history_book_lr_en.pdf 
25  Council of the European Union (1979). European Council conclusions, 29-30 November 1979. 
Retrieved 11 February 2017 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1992-
1975/ 
26 Council of the European Union (1984). European Council conclusions, 25-26 June 1984. Retrieved 11 
February 2017 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1992-1975/ 
27  Council Decision 85/257/EEC,   Euratom   of   7   May   1985   on   the   Communities’   system   of   own  
resources. Retrieved 12 February 2017 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31985D0257 
28 The ‘opt-outs’  are  a  means  of  ensuring  that  when  a  state  does  not  wish  to  join  the  others  in  a  particular  
field of EU policy, it can opt out, thus avoiding participating in it.  
29 Forster, A. (1999). Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 67.  
30 EUR-Lex (2009). The Schengen area and cooperation. Retrieved 12 February 2017 at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33020 
31 UK Visas and Immigration (2012). Guidance: Common Travel Area (CTA). Retrieved 12 February 
2012 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-travel-area-cta/common-travel-area-cta 
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In 1997 the United Kingdom also secured an EU agreement to give Britain the 
right to choose whether to take part in any new EU legislation regarding asylum and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.32 By   the   year   2007   this   right   to   ‘opt   in’ was 
broadened to cooperation in policing and criminal justice, meaning that the United 
Kingdom has the choice to opt into EU Judicial and Home Affairs (JHA) measures 
when it determines that it is in the national interest to do so,33 but it is not bound by 
these measures when it does not opt in. 
 
In addition, Britain secured a Protocol to the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the 
European Union along with Poland relating to the application of the Charter in their 
territories. Article 1(1) of this  Protocol  provides  that  the  ‘Charter does not extend the 
ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of 
Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions, practices or actions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent 
with the fundamental rights, freedoms and   principles   that   it   reaffirms’. Article 1(2) 
enshrines that the Title IV of the Charter, which contains economic and social rights, 
does not create justiciable rights, unless Poland and the United Kingdom have 
provided for such rights in their national laws. 
 
2. THE PATH TO BREXIT 
 
As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Communities became the 
European Union on the 1st of November 1993. This was illustrated by Article 1 of such 
Treaty:   ‘By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among 
themselves   a   EUROPEAN   UNION…   on   which   the   Member   States   confer  
competences to attain objectives   they   have   in   common’. The European Union hence 
marked  ‘a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe’.34  
 
However, as a matter of fact, the United Kingdom was not as willing as other 
Member States to achieve such union, following its traditional tendency against the EU 
integration project. This idea was highlighted by Professor Stephen George in his 
book An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community.35  
 
Remarkably, after the Treaty on the European Union came into force two of the 
most relevant Eurosceptic36 political parties, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and 
the Referendum Party, were formed in the years 1993 and 1994 respectively. In the 
following years, UKIP was not as successful in gaining the UK general election due to 
the British first-past-the-post election system37 as it was in the election to the European 
Parliament (EP). The reason was twofold. Firstly, following the European                                                         
32 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland adopted as part of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
signed on the 2nd of October 1997. 
33 Protocol (No. 21) to the EU Treaties, Articles 3 and 4.  
34 Article 1(2) of the Treaty on the European Union 1992.  
35 George, S. (1998). An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd edn. London: 
Oxford University Press.   
36 Euroscepticism is the criticism of and strong opposition to the European Union. 
37 It is a voting method in which voters are required to indicate on the ballot the candidate of their 
choice, and the candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate wins.  
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Parliamentary Election Act of 1999, EP elections in the United Kingdom were held 
using a system of proportional representation 38 . Secondly, when it came to EP 
elections, voters were more focused on European issues as opposed to the national 
election. This is why UKIP achieved third place in Britain during the 2004 European 
election 39  and second position in 2009, Euroscepticism combined with anti-
immigration40 sentiments being the main driving forces of its success.41  
 
The term Brexit was first used by Peter Wilding in a Euractiv blog post on the 15th 
of May 201242 with regard to a possible UK withdrawal from the European Union. It is 
a compound noun formed   by   fusing   together   the   words   ‘Britain’   and   ‘exit’, and it 
derived from Grexit, which referred to the potential departure of Greece from the 
Eurozone in 2010.43  
 
In January 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron returned to the subject of 
the  UK’s  departure  from  the  European  Union  in  his  Bloomberg  speech.  He  announced  
that the Conservative Government would hold an in/out referendum on EU 
membership during the early part of the next parliament if winning the 2015 general 
election, pointing that such referendum would take place after renegotiation of some 
key points.44  
 
UKIP reached the top position in the 2014 EP election with 27.50% of the total 
vote45 and it got 24 MEPs46, more than any other British party. This fact was strongly 
associated with the latter support for the leave campaign in the 2016 referendum.47   
 
The Conservative Party led by Cameron unexpectedly won the 2015 UK general 
election with a majority48 and subsequently the European Union Referendum Act 2015                                                         
38 Proportional representation is an electoral system in which the distribution of seats corresponds 
closely with the proportion of the total votes for each party. For example, if a party gained 30% of the 
total votes, a perfectly proportional system would allow them to gain 30% of the seats. 
39 BBC News (2004). European Election: United Kingdom Result. Retrieved 15 February 2017 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk_politics/2004/vote_2004/default.stm 
40 The 2004 accession of 8 Eastern European countries (plus Cyprus and Malta) to the European Union 
was  overshadowed  by   feared  mass  migration   of  workers   from   the  East   due   to   the  EU’s   rules   on   free  
mobility of labour. While many EU countries imposed temporary restrictions on labour mobility, the 
United Kingdom did not impose any such restrictions. 
41  BBC News (2009). European Election 2009: UK Results. Retrieved 15 February 2017 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/elections/euro/09/html/ukregion_999999.stm 
42  Wilding, P. (2012). Stumbling towards the Brexit. Retrieved 14 February 2017 at 
http://blogactiv.eu/blog/2012/05/15/stumbling-towards-the-brexit/ 
43 Hjelmgaard, K. and Onyanga-Omara, J. (2016). Explainer: The what, when and why of 'Brexit'. 
Retrieved 14 February 2017 at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/22/explainer-what-
when-and-why-brexit/80723334/  
44 BBC News (2013). David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU. Retrieved 15 February 2017 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282 
45  BBC News (2014). Vote 2014: European election results. Retrieved 15 February 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27407926  
46 Members of the European Parliament (MEP) are the people who have been elected to serve as popular 
representatives in the European Parliament.  
47 Becker, S. O. and Fetzer T. (2016). Does Migration Cause Extreme Voting? Retrieved 16 February 
2017 at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/306-
2016_becker_fetzer.pdf 
48 BBC News (2015). Conservatives win UK election. Retrieved 16 February 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015 
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was introduced to the British Parliament in order to enable the referendum announced 
by Cameron in 2013, favouring to remain in a renegotiated European Union.   
 
Cameron sought to reform four key points: protection of the single market for 
Britain and other non-euro countries, boosting competitiveness by setting a target for 
the reduction of the burden of red tape49,  exempting  Britain   from  ‘ever-closer  union’ 
and bolstering national Parliament, and restricting EU migrants' access to in-work 
benefits such as tax credits.50   
 
The result of renegotiation came out on the 19th of February 2016, including 
changes on restricting in-work benefits for new EU immigrants,51  stronger British 
sovereignty resulted from amending existing treaties to make it clear that the 
references   to   ‘ever   closer   union’ would not ever apply to Britain, and protection 
surrounding the Eurozone, namely based on the idea that that decisions would not be 
made favouring Eurozone Members over non-Euro countries. For example, non-Euro 
Members would not be asked to fund euro bailouts, like those paid during the Greek 
debt crisis.52  
 
Then Cameron said that he had achieved the reforms that he wanted, claiming that 
such reforms  would  put  the  United  Kingdom  ‘in the driving  seat’ of one of the world's 
biggest  markets  and  create  a  ‘more  flexible’ European Union.53  
 
But some Eurosceptics, like Matthew Elliott, chief executive of the Vote Leave 
campaign,   shared   the   view   that   Cameron   ‘[had declared] victory but it [was] an 
entirely  hollow  one’.54 In the same sense UKIP  leader  Nigel  Farage  tweeted:  ‘This is a 
truly pathetic deal. Let's Leave the EU, control our borders, run our own country and 
stop handing £55m every day to Brussels. I believe in Britain. We are good enough to 
be an independent, self-governing nation outside of the EU. This is our golden 
opportunity’.55  
 
2.1 The United Kingdom decision to withdraw from the EU: the 
referendum of June 2016  
                                                         
49  In many cases, practices have become extremely complex, generating unnecessary 
regulatory burdens – so-called red tape.  
50  BBC News (2015). David Cameron sets out EU reform goals. Retrieved 16 February 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-34770875 
51 Although before they could be applied, the United Kingdom would have to get permission from the 
European Commission and then from the European Council; Spaventa, E. (2016). Explaining the EU 
deal: the emergency brake. Retrieved 16 February 2017 at https://fullfact.org/europe/explaining-eu-deal-
emergency-brake/ 
52  Council of the European Union (2016). European Council conclusions, 18-19 February 2016. 
Retrieved 17 February 2017 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-
euco-conclusions/ 
53  Prime   Minister   David   Cameron’s   statement   following European Council meeting on the 19th of 
February 2016. Retrieved 17 February 2017 at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-
statement-following-european-council-meeting-19-february-2016 
54 BBC News (2015). EU deal gives UK special status, says David Cameron. Retrieved 16 February 
2017 at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35616768 
55 Ibid.  
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On the 22th of February 2016 Cameron gave a speech in the House of Commons in 
which he announced the referendum date: 23rd of June 2016.  He also commented the 
process that would be followed in the event that Britain voted against remaining in the 
European Union:  
 
‘If the British people vote to leave, there is only one way to bring that 
about, namely to trigger article 5056 of the treaties and begin the process of 
exit, and the British people would rightly expect that to start straight away. Let 
me be absolutely clear about how this works. It triggers a two-year time period 
to negotiate the arrangements for exit. At the end of this period, if no 
agreement is in place, then exit is automatic unless every one of the 27 other 
EU Member States agrees to a delay’.57 
 
Prime Minister Cameron led the campaign for the United Kingdom to remain a 
member of the Union under the conditions negotiated by his Government, providing 
the electorate with abundant information about the special status of the United 
Kingdom in the European Union, the alternatives to membership and different analysis 
on the procedure for withdrawing and on the cooperation in the fields of justice and 
defence.58 Both the Labour Party59 and the Liberal Democrats60 also supported the 
option to remain in the bloc.  
 
The most influential national and international economic organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) published some reports on the possible economic and 
financial consequences. Most of them forecasted a negative impact on the economy in 
the event of an effective withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union.61  
 
However, much of the media, and especially the newspaper industry, followed a 
pro-Leave line, with six out of nine newspapers showing a dominance of pro-Leave 
articles.62  
 
                                                        
56 He was referring to Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 2009, which amended the Maastricht Treaty 1992.  
57 Prime  Minister  David  Cameron’s  statement  on   the  European  Council  on   the  22th of February 2016. 
Retrieved 20 February 2017 at http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2016/february/statement-on-
european-council-22-february-2016/ 
58 UK Government (2016). Why the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union 
is the best decision for the UK. Retrieved 20 February 2017 at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160815143715/https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sy
stem/uploads/attachment_data/file/517014/EU_referendum_leaflet_large_print.pdf 
59  Labour Party (2016). Labour In for Britain. The facts. Retrieved 20 February 2017 at 
http://www.labour.org.uk/page/content/thefacts/ 
60 Liberal Democrats (2016). Why are Liberal Democrats campaigning to remain in Europe? Retrieved 
20 February 2017 at http://www.libdems.org.uk/europe-why-remain 
61 OECD (2016). The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision, OECD Economic Policy 
Paper No 16. Retrieved 20 February 2017 at https://www.oecd.org/eco/The-Economic-consequences-of-
Brexit-27-april-2016.pdf 
62 Bennett, A. (2016). Here's where Britain's newspapers stand on the EU referendum. Retrieved 22 
February 2017 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/heres-where-britains-newspapers-stand-on-the-eu-
referendum/ 
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The question put   to   the   electorate   was:   ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a 
member of the European Union   or   leave   the   European   Union?’ The outcome was 
published on the morning of the 24th of June: 51.9%  voted  for  the  country  to  ‘Leave’ 
and 48.2% of voters  decided  to  ‘Remain’.63 England (53.4%) and Wales (52.5%) voted 
in favour of leaving while Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar backed remaining 
in the Union by 62%, 55.8% and 95.9% respectively.64  
 
Slogans   such   as   ‘Take   back   control’   and   ‘Britain first’ had strong impact on 
important sectors of the electorate, which were more focused on immigration issues, 
the UK financial contribution to the EU budget and the democratic deficit in EU 
governance, rather than on the economic benefits of the EU membership.65  
 
Given the unexpected result in the referendum, Cameron declared that he would 
resign, pointing that it would be for the incoming Prime Minister to invoke Article 50 
of the  Lisbon  Treaty.  He  said  that  ‘A negotiation with the European Union will need to 
begin under a new Prime Minister, and I think it is right that this new Prime Minister 
takes the decision about when to trigger Article 50 and start the formal and legal 
process  of  leaving  the  EU’.66  
 
Beside   Cameron’s   resignation,   the   idea   of   a   second   referendum   was   called for 
with over four million signatures, but the Government rejected it on the 9th of July 
2016 on the basis that ‘33 million people had had their say and the decision must be 
respected’.67 The UK Foreign Office also stated that:  
 
‘The Prime Minister and Government have been clear that this was a once-
in-a-generation vote and, as the Prime Minister has said, the decision must be 
respected. We must now prepare for the process to exit the EU and the 
Government is committed to ensuring the best possible outcome for the British 
people  in  the  negotiations’.68 
 
Another immediate consequence after the outcome of the referendum was the 
financial distress in both European and world stock markets and the fall of the sterling 
pound’s  value  to  historical  lows  in  comparison with other major currencies.69  
 
                                                        
63 For a more detailed breakdown across the United Kingdom: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results 
64 Ibid.  
65  Fitzgibbon, J. (2016). How the Brexit outcome has changed our understanding of referendums. 
Retrieved 20 February 2017 at http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-
1-context/how-the-brexit-outcome-has-changed-our-understanding-of-referendums/ 
66  UK Government (2016). EU referendum outcome: PM statement, 24 June 2016. Retrieved 26 
February 2017 at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-referendum-outcome-pm-statement-24-
june-2016 
67 Slawson, N. (2016). Brexit: no second EU referendum despite e-petition, says government. Retrieved 
28 February 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/government-dashes-hopes-of-
second-eu-referendum-in-e-petition-response 
68 Ibid.  
69 Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 23 (9), pp. 1259-1277.  
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From the perspective of the European Union, there was a general feeling of regret 
and disappointment, but at the same time acceptance for the democratically reached 
decision.70  
 
2.2 Application of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty  
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on the 1st of December 2009, the 
process of withdrawal from the Union has been governed by Article 50 of this Treaty, 
which enshrines that:   
 
‘1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European 
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European 
Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, 
setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date 
of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after 
the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend 
this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European 
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not 
participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in 
decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request 
shall be subject to the procedure  referred  to  in  Article  49’. 
 
Therefore the process of withdrawal provided in  Article  50  aims  at  ‘setting  out  the  
arrangements’ for the withdrawal of the Member State,  while   further   ‘taking account 
of the framework of the future relationship with   the  Union’. This means that, in the 
Brexit case, the future UK-EU relationship is to be set out in an instrument separated 
from the withdrawal treaty due to the constitutional nature of both instruments.71 The 
withdrawal treaty will be concluded solely by Britain and the European Union 
(without its Member States,   as   this   is   not   to   be   a   ‘mixed   agreement’72), whereas the                                                         
70 Tell Cremades, M. and Novak, P. (2017). Brexit and the European Union: General Institutional and 
Legal Considerations. Retrieved 1 March 2017 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)571404 
71 Ibid.  
72  Mixed agreements cover subject matters in respect of which both the European Union and the 
Member States have competence. For mixed agreements to take effect, the Member States as well as the 
European Union must sign and conclude/ratify them 
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instrument regulating the future relationship, which will have an impact on the existing 
rights and obligations of all Member States, will have to be concluded by the European 
Union as a bloc, each of its Members and the United Kingdom, as this will be a  ‘mixed  
agreement’.73  
 
Notably, the   procedural   consequence   of   ‘mixity’ is that Member States have to 
ratify the agreement according to their own constitutional ratification procedures,74 and 
this may lead to the difficulty in reaching an agreement that benefits all parts involved. 
As pointed by Van der Loo and Blockmans: 
 
‘In some cases, for example Belgium, this will require the consent of the 
constituting parts of the federation. When more than 35 national and regional 
parliaments are involved on the EU side alone, one can imagine that this 
renders the disentanglement of mixed agreements much more vulnerable, 
requiring negotiations that provide an opportunity for each of the respective 
third parties too to try  and  squeeze  out  a  better  deal’.75  
 
The European Parliament adopted on the 28th of June 2016 a resolution 
highlighting that the will of the majority of the British people should be respected and 
calling for the activation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.76  
 
David Cameron stood down on the 13th of July 2016 and Theresa May replaced 
him as Prime Minister. But Mrs. May made it clear that neither discussions with the 
European Union would start nor the UK Government would trigger Article 50 in 2016: 
 
‘I want to work with... the European Council in a constructive spirit to 
make this a sensible and orderly departure… All of us will need time to prepare 
for these negotiations and the United Kingdom will not invoke Article 50 until 
our  objectives  are  clear’.77  
 
In order to leave the Union Britain has to do it in   accordance   with   ‘its own 
constitutional   requirements’. Nonetheless, the Constitution in the United Kingdom is 
unwritten, it is based on the Acts of Parliament, court judgments and conventions. The 
fact that no legal precedence about this issue existed generated mass uncertainty and 
debate.  
 
Opinions differed on whether notification to the European Council could be given 
by the UK Government without the explicit approval of the British Parliament. The 
Government’s  view  was  clear:  the decision to leave the EU was taken by the public in                                                         
73 Tell Cremades, M. and Novak, P., op. cit. 70.  
74  Van der Loo, G. and Blockmans, S. (2016). The impact of Brexit on   the   EU’s   International  
Agreements. Retrieved 6 March 2017 at https://www.ceps.eu/publications/impact-brexit-
eu%E2%80%99s-international-agreements 
75 Ibid.  
76 European Parliament Resolution of 28 June 2016 on the Decision to leave the EU resulting from the 
UK referendum. Retrieved 6 March 2017 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0294+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
77 Sparrow, A. and Phipps, C. (2016). Theresa May arrives in Berlin for Brexit talks with Merkel – as it 
happened. Retrieved 6 March 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/jul/20/germany-
uk-brexit-theresa-may-angela-merkel-politics-live 
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the referendum on the 23rd of  June  2016  and  the  UK  Government’s executive powers, 
under the royal prerogative, were sufficient to give notice to the EU on behalf of the 
cabinet.78  
 
This approach was challenged by a number of claimants, who brought the case 
before the High Court of England and Wales on the basis that ‘it would frustrate the 
rights and duties enacted by Parliament in the European Communities Act 1972, and 
would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of that Act, namely to give effect to 
the rights and duties consequent on membership of the EU’.79 On the 3rd of November 
2016,  the  Court  ruled  that  Britain  required  the  Parliament’s  approval  (the  majority  of  
all MPs voting in favour in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords) 
before formally starting the process to leave the EU, describing the passing of the 
European Communities Act 1972 as  the  major  step  of  ‘switching on the direct effect of 
EU law in the national   legal  systems’. The Court also explained that it is implausible 
that Parliament's intention was that the Crown should be able to switch it off 
unilaterally by exercise of its prerogative powers.80 
 
The UK Government appealed against this ruling and the Supreme Court's 
decision was given on the 24th of January 2017, upholding the judgment of the High 
Court on the basis that an act of Parliament was required to invoke Article 50. The 
Supreme Court also concluded that legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland had no legal right to veto the Act.81  
 
After this dispute, David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union,  formally  introduced  the  ‘Act to Confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, 
under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom's intention 
to  withdraw   from   the  EU’, for first reading in the House of Commons on the 26th of 
January 2017. The vote for the bill's second reading was carried on the 1st of February 
by 498 to 114 in favour and, at third reading, the Commons passed the bill by 494 to 
122 on the 8th of February, sending it for debate in the House of Lords.82 The upper 
chamber made two amendments based on the guarantee of the rights of EU citizens 
living in Britain and giving lawmakers more powers to reject the final terms of 
negotiations with the bloc, but Mr. Davis stated that the UK Government aimed to 
overturn the Lords amendments in the House of Commons.83 On the 13th of March the 
Commons voted against the first Lords amendment by 335 to 287 and against the 
                                                        
78 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP (2016). Judicial review litigation over the correct constitutional process 
for triggering Article 50 TEU. Retrieved 6 March 2017 at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f43e102f-ea09-4449-b781-a35ecfe628fe 
79 Ibid.  
80 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 
(Admin), para. 6.  
81 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.  
82 UK Parliament (2017). European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill – House of Commons 
Hansard. Retrieved 9 February 2017 at https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-02-
08/debates/B9545C0C-B593-43E4-A12E-
2AD5D47DEFE4/EuropeanUnion(NotificationOfWithdrawal)Bill 
83 Hughes, L. (2017). Article 50 bill: Theresa May suffers defeat on 'meaningful vote' amendment as 
peers back the change by 366 to 268. Retrieved 9 March 2017 at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/07/brexit-lords-vote-article-50-amendment-watch-live/ 
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second by 331 to 286.84 As a result, the bill was finally passed into law unamended by 
both Houses of Parliament as the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 
2017, receiving royal assent on the 16th of March 85  and hence conferring Prime 
Minister Theresa May the power to invoke Article 50.  
 
Meanwhile the legislative procedure was taking place, the UK Government 
published a white paper reporting the twelve points which were set out by Prime 
Minister Theresa May in her speech at Lancaster on the 17th of January 2017.86 The 
document called for a new, positive and constructive partnership ‘in   the   mutual  
interest’ of the United Kingdom and the European Union for when the United 
Kingdom left the single market that included  ‘providing certainty and clarity wherever 
possible, ensuring free trade with European markets, controlling immigration and 
taking  control  of  our  own  law’.87  
 
Theresa May signed the letter invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on the 28th 
of March 2017 and the letter was delivered on the 29th March by the UK's envoy to the 
European Union, Tim Barrow, to the President of the European Council Donald 
Tusk,88 firing the starting gun on the two-year departure process from the EU.  
 
 2.3 Revocability of notification?  
 
There is a slight possibly that, in the course of the negotiations, Britain could 
revoke or withdraw its notification. The Lisbon Treaty does not provide explicitly for 
such a situation, and it has not been dealt in the academic literature either, as it has 
been generally assumed that a withdrawal decision would be irrevocable. 
 
The issue is controversial. On the one hand, Article 68 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969 enshrines   the   general   rule   that   ‘a notification or 
instrument provided for in Article 65 or 67 [regarding the procedures for withdrawal 
and termination] may be revoked at any time   before   it   takes   effect’. Several legal 
experts support this argument on  the  basis  that  ‘there is nothing in Article 50 formally 
to prevent a Member State from reversing its decision to withdraw in the course of the 
negotiations’89, together with the idea that the Treaty is generally aimed at preserving 
the Union.  
 
                                                        
84  UK Parliament (2017). European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill: Commons Stages. 
Retrieved 18 March 2017 at http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2017/january/commons-european-
union-notification-of-withdrawal-bill/  
85 Ibid.  
86 HM Government (2017). The  United  Kingdom’s  Exit   from  and  New  Partnership  with   the  European  
Union, White Paper, Cm 9417. Retrieved 2 February 2017 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589189/The_United_Kin
gdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Print.pdf 
87 Ibid. 
88 BBC News (2017). Article 50: UK set to formally trigger Brexit process. Retrieved 11 March 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39422353 
89 11th Report of the House of Lords. The process of withdrawing from the European Union, HL, 138, 4 
May 2016. Retrieved 11 March 2017 at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf 
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On the   other   hand,   the   fact   that   ‘no reference to such a contingency is made in 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty should not lead to the conclusion that a revocation is 
allowed unless the opposite  can  be   inferred’.90 Some have noted that the reference in 
Article 50(6) allowing the withdrawing state to reapply for membership can be 
interpreted to mean that the drafters of the Treaty took into consideration the 
possibility of such state changing its mind, and provided that a new application would 
be the only possible answer.91  
 
The matter emerged briefly during the court action on Brexit mentioned above. In 
this instance, the High  Court  stated  the  issue  as  ‘common  ground  between  the  parties’, 
pointing that both parties had agreed that notice under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 
is definite and cannot be conditional.92 However, the High Court did not provide any 
final solution to this issue due to the fact that it was not considered relevant to the case.  
 
In any circumstance, should the problem arise in practice, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) will ultimately make a determination, as no national court 
has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50. 
 
 2.4 The EU facing the withdrawal agreement’s  negotiations 
 
The European Union named its chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, in late 
July 2016, in order to be prepared for the EU-UK negotiations.  
 
After many months of debate and following the formal activation of Article 50 of 
the Lisbon Treaty by Theresa May, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 
the 5th of April 2017 officially laying down its key principles and conditions for its 
approval of the UK's withdrawal agreement, noting that any such agreement at the end 
of UK-EU negotiations will need to be approved by the European Parliament.93 MEPs 
stressed the importance of ensuring equal and fair treatment for EU citizens living in 
the United Kingdom and British citizens living in the Union.94 They also pointed out 
that Britain remains a EU member until its official departure, and that this entails 
rights but also obligations, including financial commitments which may run beyond 
the withdrawal date.95  
 
The EP resolution warns against any trade-off between security and the future EU-
UK economic relationship, opposes any sort of ‘cherry picking’ or a piecemeal 
economic relationship based on sector-specific deals, and reiterates the indivisibility of 
the four freedoms of the single market –free movement of goods, capital, services, and 
people–. 96  Finally, the resolution says that discussions on possible transitional                                                         
90 Tell Cremades, M. and Novak, P., op. cit. 70.  
91  Lazowski, A. (2012). Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 
European Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 523-540. 
92 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, op. cit. 80.  
93  European Parliament News (2017). Red lines on Brexit negotiations. Retrieved 8 April at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170329IPR69054/red-lines-on-brexit-
negotiations 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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arrangements  could  only  begin  when  ‘substantial progress’ has been made in talks on 
how the Britain is going to leave the Union.97 
 
Moreover, the European Council published its guidelines for Brexit negotiations 
on the 29th of April, in which it welcomes the resolution of the European Parliament.98 
In this document the Council makes clear that ‘the Union's overall objective in these 
negotiations will be to preserve its interests, those of its citizens, its businesses and its 
Member   States’.99 It also provides the EU core principles: the four freedoms of the 
single market are indivisible and separate negotiations between individual Member 
States and Britain on matters pertaining to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union could not be made. The guidelines also mention that the first 
phase of the negotiations will aim to provide as much clarity and legal certainty to 
citizens, businesses, stakeholders and international partners on the immediate effects 
of   the   UK’s   withdrawal   from   the   bloc,   and   to settle the disentanglement of Britain 
from the Union and from all the rights and obligations that derive from commitments 
undertaken as a Member State. They   add   that   ‘an overall understanding on the 
framework for the future relationship should be identified during a second phase of the 
negotiations under Article  50  of   the  Lisbon  Treaty’,   finally stating that the European 
Union stands ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions as soon as the 
European Council decides that sufficient progress has been made in the first phase 
towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for an orderly 
withdrawal.100 
 
More recently the Council, meeting in a EU27 format (without Britain), adopted 
a decision on the 22th of May authorising the opening of Brexit negotiations with the 
United Kingdom and nominating the European Commission as the EU negotiator 
institution.101 In the same day the Council published the ‘Directives for the negotiation 
of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union’ 102  (a 
mandate for the Commission), intended for the first phase of the negotiations starting 
on the 19th of June 2017. 103  The Directives mainly describe the nature of the 
withdrawal agreement, which is to be solely negotiated and concluded by the Union, 
and the content which will have to be necessary included in it, such as the withdrawal 
date (30th of March 2019 unless both sides agree to an extension, as provided in Article 
50  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty),  the  citizens’  rights  to  be  covered,  the  financial  settlement,  the  
situation of goods placed on the market, the outcome of procedures based on Union 
law and other administrative issues relating to the functioning of the Union. The 
agreement   should   also   ‘set up an institutional structure to ensure an effective                                                         
97 Ibid. 
98 European Council (2017). European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations. Retrieved 30 
April at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/ 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
101 European Council (2017). Council (Art 50) authorises the start of Brexit talks and adopts negotiating 
directives. Retrieved 24 May 2017 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/05/22-brexit-negotiating-directives/ 
102 European Council (2017). General Affairs Council (Art. 50), 22/05/2017. Retrieved 24 May 2017 at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2017/05/22/ 
103  Boffey, D. (2017). Brexit negotiations set to start on 19 June. Retrieved 22 May 2017 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/19/brexit-uk-eu-talks-start-19-june 
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enforcement of the commitments under the Agreement, bearing in mind the Union's 
interest in effectively protecting its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of 
the Court of  Justice  of  the  European  Union’.104  
 
3. A EUROPEAN UNION WITHOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
3.1 The European response  
 
Aware of the importance of this historical vote, some EU institutions emphasized 
the need for stronger measures within the Union itself. ‘If the European Union is to 
boost its capacity to act, restore citizens’ trust and make the euro zone economy more 
resilient to outside shocks, it needs to make full use of the Lisbon Treaty. But to go 
further, it needs to reform itself more fundamentally’.105 This was the main message of 
three resolutions exploring the future development of the bloc approved by the 
European Parliament on the 16th of February 2017.106 Some of the changes include 
‘creating an EU finance minister and giving the EU Commission the power to 
formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy, backed up by a euro-area 
budget…  turning  the  Council  of  Ministers   into  a  genuine  second   legislative  chamber,  
and  its  configurations  into  preparatory  bodies  similar  to  Parliament’s  committees’, and 
‘reducing the size of the College of EU Commissioners substantially, including by 
cutting the number of Vice-Presidents  to  two’. 107 
 
Furthermore, immediately after Theresa May formally triggered Article 50, the 
European Commission outlined five scenarios for the future of the European Union in 
the White Paper on the future of the European Union published on the 1st of April 
2017.108 The paper is an attempt by the Commission, led by its President Jean-Claude 
Juncker,  to  shape  a  major  debate  about  the  EU’s  future  reforms  after  the  Brexit vote.  
 
It starts acknowledging the existential struggle that the European Union is facing 
due to crises over Brexit,  migration  and   the  eurozone.   ‘Europe’s  challenges show no 
sign  of  abating’, the paper noted.109 Then the paper introduces the five scenarios. 
 
The   first   scenario,   named   ‘carrying   on’, assumes that the remaining Member 
States would stick on the current course, continuing to focus on reforms, jobs, growth 
and investment.110 There   would   be   only   ‘incremental progress’ on strengthening the 
single currency, and citizens' rights derived from EU law would be upheld. The second 
one,  ‘nothing  but   the  single  market’,  would  clearly  put  the  single  market   in  the  EU’s  
focus.111 This scenario contains plans to perform harder work on migration, security or 
defence but it is more reluctant to agree new common rules on the mobility of workers,                                                         
104 Ibid.  
105 European Parliament News (2017). Parliament sets out its vision for the future of Europe. Retrieved 
11 March 2017 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170210IPR61812/parliament-
sets-out-its-vision-for-the-future-of-europe 
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 European Commission (2017). White Paper on the future of Europe: Avenues for unity for the EU at 
27. Retrieved 2 April 2017 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.htm 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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so free movement of workers and services would not be fully guaranteed under this 
path.  According  to  the  third  one,  ‘those who want to do more’, if the Member States 
want to work more together with others, they could.112 Willing groups of countries 
could form coalitions on key areas, such as defence, internal security, taxation and 
justice. Relations with third countries, including trade negotiations, would remain 
managed at the EU level on behalf of all Member States. Under the scenario number 
four, known as   ‘doing   less,  more  effectively’, the European Union would focus on a 
reduced agenda: technological innovation, trade, security, immigration, borders and 
defence. 113  It would leave other areas, such as regional development, health, 
employment, social policy, to the Member States' own governments, and it would also 
leave counter-terrorism work, asylum claims and border control to be tackled by EU 
agencies. Finally, the fifth scenario,   ‘doing   much   more   together’, observes EU 
members agreeing to expand the Union's   role.  Members  would   agree   ‘to share more 
power, resources and decision-making  across  the  board’. The single currency would be 
in the spotlight, and EU law would have a much larger role. Decisions and actions 
would also be taken more quickly.  
 
However,   the   paper   warns   that   ‘there is the risk of alienating parts of society 
which feel that the EU lacks legitimacy or has taken too much power away from 
national  authorities’. 
 
‘I shall not tell you my absolute preference today, because it is not up to me all to 
take   this   decision’,   Juncker   said   in   the   European   Parliament’s   debate   on   the  White  
Paper on the future of the European Union, 114  inviting the European Parliament, 
national parliaments, governments and citizens to participate in the debate.  
 
Some lead MEPs from Parliament’s political groups welcomed the Commission’s 
decision to outline five possible paths for the European Union to take in the coming 
years, while others showed dissatisfaction with it for not picking a clear preferred path 
or providing concrete examples.115 
 
3.2 The  ‘soft’  and  ‘hard’  Brexit  
 
Since   Britain’s   decision   to   withdraw   from   the   EU   in   June   2016   speculations 
immediately remained over what kind of relationship the United Kingdom would 
develop with their partners after leaving the bloc.  
 
There are a several possible post-EU arrangements for both the United Kingdom 
and the European Union which are still being discussed. Although there are no 
definitive guidelines yet, analysts have mostly categorised the possible exit strategies 
into two broad  types:  ‘hard’  and  ‘soft’.  
 
                                                        
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 European Parliament News (2017). Future of the EU: MEPs discuss five scenarios set out by Jean-
Claude Juncker. Retrieved 2 April 2017 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20170228IPR64287/future-of-the-eu-meps-discuss-five-scenarios-set-out-by-jean-claude-juncker 
115 Ibid. 
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Both terms were coined more than a year before the referendum in a report to 
HSBC by Simon Wells and Liz Martins of February 2015. 116  In the report, the 
economists distinguished between hard and soft exits from the Union, pointing out that 
whereas  the  former  would  be  a  ‘huge  risk’  and  ‘operationally  complicated’,   the  latter  
would  be  ‘less risky, but maintains much of the status quo’.117  
 
Adopting the same terminology, the UK Parliament produced a Brexit glossary118 
in  order  to  clarify  the   jargon  being  used  about  Britain’s  departure  from  the  European  
Union.  
 
Desirable by many who voted to remain in the Union, the soft Brexit approach 
would leave the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union close to the 
existing arrangements. It is true that Britain would no longer be a member of the 
European Union and would not have a seat on the European Council, but it would still 
keep access to the European single market. By words of the UK Parliament, soft Brexit 
would   be   ‘a situation in which the UK leaves the EU but negotiates continued 
membership of the European Economic Area and largely staying in the single market 
while giving up influence   over   single   market   rules’.119 National models which have 
adopted this kind of deal include Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which are not 
Members of the EU but have access to the single market by being part of the European 
Economic Area. In return, these states must make payments to EU budgets and accept 
the  ‘four  freedoms’ of movement of goods, services, capital and people. 
 
As Britain would observe the four freedoms and would have access to the single 
market, soft Brexit would mean in practice continued free access for European 
nationals to work and settle in the United Kingdom, British trade of goods and services 
with the remaining EU states on a tariff-free   basis   and   ‘passporting rights’120  for 
financial firms to sell services and operate branches in the EU.121 Moreover, provided 
that Britain would remain within the EU's customs union, exports would not be subject 
to border checks.  
 
On the contrary, hard Brexit, as defined by the UK Parliament, would be ‘a 
situation in which the UK leaves the EU swiftly and probably with a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the EU. A very hard Brexit would involve resorting to World 
Trade   Organisation   (WTO)   rules’. 122 According to this view, the United Kingdom 
would undoubtedly give up full access to the EU's single market in order to have full                                                         
116  Wells, S. and Martins, L. (2015). A very British dilemma. Retrieved 14 March 2017 at 
http://www.capitalsynthesis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HSBC-FX-GBPelections-10-3-15.pdf 
117 Ibid.  
118 Gadd, E. (2017). Brexit Glossary. Retrieved 14 March 2017 at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7840#fullreport 
119 Ibid.  
120 The EU's passporting rules allow businesses to sell services across the union from anywhere within it 
and only require companies to be regulated in one country, rather than everywhere they operate. 
Normally, UK financial firms have been able to provide a range of financial services anywhere in the 
EU and in the wider European Economic Area (EEA) while being based in the United Kingdom and 
regulated by UK authorities.  
121 Sims, A. (2016). What is the difference between hard and soft Brexit? Everything you need to know. 
Retrieved 14 March 2017 at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-hard-soft-what-is-
the-difference-uk-eu-single-market-freedom-movement-theresa-may-a7342591.html 
122 Gadd, E. op. cit. 118.  
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control over its borders and it would withdraw from the EU's customs union, meaning 
this in practice refusing the free movement of people, trading with the European Union 
as if it were any other nation, losing its passporting rights and a significant increase in 
bureaucratic checks on goods passing through ports and airports.123  
 
After many months of uncertainty, Theresa May finally put an end to speculation 
over what kind of Brexit would try to seek in her speech at Lancaster on the 17th of 
January 2017. Both in this speech and in the white paper of the UK Government that 
was published after the House of Commons authorised Mrs. May to invoke Article 
50124, Britain set out its Brexit plans over twelve points, amongst which the most 
relevant were the commitments   for   the   United   Kingdom   to   leave   the   EU’s   single 
market, to withdraw from the customs union and to bring an end to the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in the United Kingdom.125 This is clearly a 
hard Brexit approach. However, in her letter to Donald Tusk invoking Article 50 
Theresa May adopted a conciliatory tone, which was said to be polite but forceful 
compared to speeches she has given earlier. In the letter, she emphasized post-Brexit 
cooperation and her sincere wish that the European Union succeeds and prospers in the 
future.126  
 
Mrs.  May’s   real  plan   for  hard  Brexit rapidly got back on track just the day after 
delivering such letter, when the UK Government  published  details  of  its  ‘Great Repeal 
Bill’.127 ‘We will end   the   supremacy  of   the  EU   law’, said the Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union David Davis.128  
 
After the majority of voters said ‘Leave’ in the referendum of June 2016, the idea 
of ending the European Union's legal supremacy gradually became prominent in the 
UK  Government’s  agenda.   
 
In October 2016, the UK Government promised a Great Repeal Bill which would 
abolish the European Communities Act 1972, the historic law that took Britain into the 
Union and that gives EU law instant effect in this country, and that would empower 
the UK Parliament to absorb parts of EU legislation into UK law and to eliminate the 
elements that it does not want to preserve.129 Then, until the United Kingdom actually 
leaves, EU law would continue to apply. But after leaving, the Great Repeal Act would 
come into force.130  
 
In April 2017, Theresa May called a snap general election to be held on the 8th of 
June 2017, claiming that divisions at Westminster risked hampering the Brexit                                                         
123 Sims, A. op. cit. 121.  
124 HM Government, op. cit. 86.  
125 BBC News (2017). Brexit: UK to leave single market, says Theresa May. Retrieved 15 March 2017 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38641208  
126 BBC News, op. cit. 88.  
127  UK Government (2017). Legislating   for   the   United   Kingdom’s   withdrawal   from   the   European  
Union, White Paper, Cm 9446. Retrieved 15 March 2017 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-great-repeal-bill-white-paper 
128 BBC News (2017). Brexit: UK sets out plans to replace all EU laws. Retrieved 3 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39439554 
129 Ibid.  
130  BBC News (2017). Great Repeal Bill: All you need to know. Retrieved 3 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39266723 
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negotiations.131 ‘The  country  is  coming  together  but  Westminster  is  not…  The  division  
in Westminster will risk our ability to make a success of Brexit’, Mrs. May said.132  
 
Given this context, all political parties launched their manifestos. In relation to the 
UK’s   withdrawal,   Labour’s   Manifesto,   ‘Negotiating Brexit’, aimed at dropping the 
Conservatives’   Great   Repeal   Bill,   with   a   strong   emphasis   on   retaining   the   single  
market and the customs union.133 Labour  also  rejected  ‘no  deal’ as a possible option. 
On the opposite, the Conservative Manifesto, ‘Forward Together, Our Plan for a 
Stronger Britain  and  a  Prosperous  Future’, sought a new  ‘deep and special partnership 
with the   European   Union’, while leaving the single market and customs union and 
maintaining   a   common   travel   area   with   a   ‘frictionless’ border with Ireland. The 
Conservative   approach   also   defended   that   ‘no deal is better than   a   bad   deal’ for the 
United Kingdom.134 The  Liberal  Democrats’  central pledge was giving voters another 
say on Brexit with a second referendum, with an option of staying in the European 
Union, at the same time that it pushed for the membership of the single market and the 
customs union and for the protection of rights for EU citizens living in Britain and UK 
citizens living abroad.135 
 
The result was that the Conservatives not only lost 13 seats since 2015 but also 
lost their parliamentary majority and had to turn to the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) to support them in forming a new government.136 The Labour, in the second 
position after the Conservative Party, were the most benefited by the election, as the 
gained 30 seats at the expense of all of their rivals.137  
 
The deal to be reached by the Conservatives and the DUP, which is expected 
sooner rather than later, is of paramount importance as it  challenges  Mrs.  May’s  hard 
Brexit approach in favour of a softer Brexit, with particular emphasis on not disrupting 
movement across the Irish border.138  
 
Although the DUP was the only party in Northern Ireland to campaign for the 
departure from the European Union in last year's referendum, its leader Arlene Foster 
never considered leaving the single market. ‘No-one wants to see a hard Brexit, what 
we want to   see   is  a  workable  plan   to   leave   the  European  Union,  and   that’s  what the 
national   vote   was   about…   therefore   we   need   to   get   on   with   that’, she said in an 
                                                        
131 Boyle, D. and Maidment, J. (2017). Theresa May announces snap general election on June 8 to 'make 
a success of Brexit'. Retrieved 20 April 2017 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/breaking-
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133  Labour Party (2017). Negotiating Brexit. Retrieved 2 June 2017 at  
http://www.labour.org.uk/index.php/manifesto2017/brexit 
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Prosperous Future. Retrieved 2 June 2017 at  https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto 
135  Liberal Democrats (2017).  Our Manifesto. Retrieved 2 June 2017 at  
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136  BBC News (2017). Results of the 2017 General Election. Retrieved 10 June 2017 at 
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interview for Sky News.139  ‘We need to do it in a way that respects the specific 
circumstances of Northern Ireland, and, of course, our shared history and geography 
with the Republic of Ireland’, she added.140  
 
Instead, DUP advocates for a comprehensive free trade and customs agreement 
with the bloc and for an arrangement to facilitate ease of movement of people, goods 
and services, as it has to be beard in mind that one-third of the Northern Ireland 
exports in 2015 went to the Republic of Ireland, which is already a EU Member.141 
 
3.3 Economical, legal, political and institutional effects    
It has repeatedly been noted that Britain has not actually left the European Union 
yet. The real change may only happen once it does. The current uncertainty, ahead of 
talks between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Union over what form Brexit 
will take, has been an issue for many experts, politics and the mass media, that have 
tried to warn, inform and explain the consequences that Brexit is causing and may 
cause both for Britain and the rest of the Union.   
 
3.3.1 Economy  
 
The European Union is facing a very important challenge: the departure of one of 
its largest and most important Member States. Britain is the fifth largest economy in 
the world and the second largest in the European Union.142 However, all studies agree 
that the losses will be considerably larger for the United Kingdom than for the other 27 
Members of the Union.143  
 
Theresa May and her cabinet want to launch the United Kingdom towards a hard 
Brexit that would take Britain outside the single market and the customs union, giving 
up the free space of internal borders and regulatory obstacles where people, goods, 
capital and services may move freely. Nonetheless, this approach was challenged after 
the outcome of the UK general election of June 2017, as DUP does not support leaving 
the single market.  
 
Belonging to this kind of market offers evident economic advantages, such as the 
passporting rights that have already been mentioned. That is why until the moment of 
signing the letter invoking Article 50, Theresa May insisted that she intended to 
control the entry of Europeans into the United Kingdom without leaving such market. 
                                                        
139 Allen, E. (2017). How will the general election result affect Brexit? Retrieved 13 June 2017 at 
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But the European Union repeatedly emphasized that the four fundamental freedoms of 
movement  are  ‘indivisible’.144  
 
The United Kingdom will now have to negotiate a new free trade agreement with 
Brussels,  which  May  wants  to  be  ‘bold  and  ambitious’ and not a scrap of one of those 
that the European Union actually has with countries such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway or Switzerland, that participate in the single market but are also abided by the 
decisions of the European Council.145  
 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to have a final UK-EU free trade deal by March 
2019.  ‘Experience tells us that very complicated trade agreements take  time’, pointed 
the expert of the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels Janis Emmanouilidis,146 
referring to free trade agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) reached by the European Union and Canada in October 
2016, which has been negotiated since 2009 and is still pending ratification.  
 
There is also a possibility of no reaching a EU-UK free trade deal. ‘No deal is 
better than a   bad   deal’147 , declared Theresa May in January 2017. And the same 
statement was reproduced in the Conservative Manifesto for the 2017 general election.  
 
In the event that Britain fell out of the European Union without a deal, it would 
mean relying on WTO rules to govern trade.148 In light of this, Emmanouilidis noted 
that  ‘a  growing  number  of  [European]  companies…  will  consider  whether  they  should  
remain or invest in the United Kingdom’.149 In fact, one of the biggest concerns in the 
context of the Brexit vote has been about the future of London as the largest European 
financial centre, since some of the biggest investment banks in the City of London 
such as HBSC and UBS already confirmed the transfer of part of their activities abroad 
when the United Kingdom leaves the Union.150  
 
For its part, the Bank of England has written hundreds of banks, insurers and 
financial firms warning them to be ready for all possible outcomes and giving them a 
deadline, the 14th of  July  2017,   to  explain  how  they  are  planning  the  UK’s  departure, 
especially given the uncertain issue of the British passporting rights that nowadays 
allow British-based banks and insurers to do business with the remaining Members of 
the  Union.  Mark  Carney,  the  Bank’s  Governor,  said  that  the  main  purpose  of this order 
is  to  ensure  that  ‘all firms are making, and stand ready to execute in good time should 
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April 2017 at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/146315.pdf 
145 BBC News (2017). Brexit: Fresh legal challenge blocked by High Court. Retrieved 5 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38854095 146 EFE (2017). ¿Qué consecuencias tendrá la renuncia del Reino Unido al mercado único?. Retrieved 5 
April 2017 at http://www.expansion.com/economia/2017/01/21/588357ce22601d480f8b45ce.html 
147 Portes,  J.  (2017).  No  EU  trade  deal  is  better  than  a  bad  deal?  Don’t  be  on  it,  Theresa  May.  Retrieved  
6 April 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/23/eu-trade-deal-theresa-may-
brexit-divorce 
148 Ibid.  
149 Council of the European Union, op. cit. 52.   
150  BBC News (2017). City banks warn of Brexit job moves. Retrieved 6 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38663537 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS -                                                                                            Nº 1/2017, 26 DE JUNIO DE 2017 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL  
26 
the need arise, contingency plans for the full   range   of   possible   scenarios’, 151 
particularly  now  that  the  UK’s  economy  growth  is slowing due to the higher inflation.  
 
According to Carney, the United Kingdom was relying on consumer spending for 
economic growth, rather than exports   or   investment,   but   it   ‘bodes poorly for the 
future’.152  Despite   the   fell   of   the   sterling   pound’s   value   to   historical   lows   after   the  
referendum, Britain had one of the world's fastest-growing advanced economies in 
2016. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that growth in 2016 was 1.8% 
higher than that in 2015.153 Consumers played a key role: confidence remained strong 
and subsequently unemployment declined further. Additionally, the service sector 
remained the main contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP).154 But the UK’s  
economy seems to be no longer growing this year. The Bank of England forecasted 
that growth would slow in 2017 as higher inflation is weighting on consumer 
spending.155 
 
3.3.2 Law  
 
As previously mentioned, the biggest legal impact of Brexit intended by the UK 
Government would be transferring the whole of EU law on to the UK statute book as 
soon as the United Kingdom get separated from the Union, what is aimed by the Great 
Repeal Bill. Described  by  Theresa  May  as  an  ‘essential  step’, the Bill wants to avoid 
both   a   ‘black   hole   in   [the   UK]   statute   book’ and disruption to businesses and 
individual citizens when Britain officially leaves.156  
 
The Great Repeal Bill can be summarized in three principal ideas.157 Firstly, it 
would repeal the European Communities Act 1972, the historic law that took Britain 
into the Union and that gives EU law instant effect in this country. Secondly, the Bill 
would convert all EU law concerning environment, health, safety, immigration, 
consumer  protection…  into UK law to prevent a legal black hole after Brexit. Thirdly, 
it would create the necessary powers for Members of Parliament (MPs) to ‘correct the 
statute   book   where   necessary’ once Britain has left the EU, without seeking full 
Parliamentary approval. This latter point was the most criticised due to the 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive and the evident circumvention of 
parliamentary control. 158  There are concerns that under the so-called Henry VIII                                                         
151 Allen, K. (2017). Bank of England orders financial firms to draft Brexit contingency plans. Retrieved 
6 April 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/07/brexit-city-europe-carney-bank-of-
england-uk-eu 
152 Plummer, R. (2017). Mark Carney warns of consumer slowdown this year. Retrieved 6 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38644963 
153 Office for National Statistics (2016). Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Retrieved 6 April 2017 at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp 
154  Hermes, E. (2017). Euler Hermes: Brexit’s   economic   impact   on   UK   and   European economies. 
Retrieved 8 April 2017 at http://www.eulerhermes.com/mediacenter/news/Lists/NewsDocuments/press-
release-Euler-Hermes-Brexit-economic-impact-UK-European-economies-16-03-17.pdf 
155 Plummer, R., op. cit. 152.  
156  BBC News (2017). Great Repeal Bill: All you need to know. Retrieved 8 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39266723 
157 UK Government, op. cit. 127.  
158 Peer, S. (2017). The White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill: Invasion of the Parliamentary Control 
Snatchers. Retrieved 8 April 2017 at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.es/2017/03/the-white-paper-on-
great-repeal-bill.html 
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clauses159, dated as of 1539, the Government may be empowered to change previous 
laws (about 12.000  EU  regulations  in  force,  as  noted  by  the  UK  Government’s  White  
Paper 160 ) that have already been passed by Parliament, without seeking further 
parliamentary approval. 
 
Bill Cash, a Tory eurosceptic MP, supported the Government’s plans:   ‘What we 
will be doing is returning sovereignty to this house so that the decisions taken in our 
law  making  are  made  by  the  British  people’s  representatives  in  this  House’.161 
 
Other Ministers also tried to reassure critics by pointing that such measures will be 
temporary and will not be used to make policy changes.162 But many others, including 
Scotland's Brexit Minister Mike Russel, shared the contrary view.163 ‘Brexit is likely to 
cause the biggest legal train  crash  in  modern  history’, said Robert Bell, head of the EU 
and UK competition team at the international law firm Bryan Cave.164 He also added 
that   ‘The consequences, together with the problems of legal interpretation and the 
uncertainties created, will be felt for generations. It is the modern equivalent of Henry 
VIII’s  break  with  Rome, except  many  times  more  complex’.165 
 
This was not the only criticism. One of the messages that the UK Government has 
repeated since the decision of the British people to leave the Union is that the 
withdrawal would not entail a loss of any right, particularly of social rights. However, 
the   Government’s   White   Paper   on   the   Great Repeal Bill states that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union would not be incorporated into UK law on 
the   basis   that   ‘the Charter was not designed to create any new rights or alter the 
circumstances in which individuals could rely on fundamental rights to challenge the 
actions of the EU Institutions or Member   States   in   relation   to   EU   law’. 166  This 
argument is incorrect, as the Charter introduced many new rights and principles of 
enormous relevance and non-existent under EU law until the entry into force of the 
Charter in 2009, such as the prohibition of human cloning as part of the fundamental 
right to physical integrity (article 2.2.d), the freedom to found educational 
establishments (article 14.3) and the right to working conditions equivalent to those of 
citizens of the Union (article 15.3).167                                                         
159 Named for the king who forced the passing of the Statute of Proclamations 1539 empowering his 
decisions both to change and have the same force as legislative acts, such a clause enables government 
to repeal or amend primary legislation by means of a secondary act with limited or no further 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
160 UK Government, op. cit. 127. 
161 David  Davis’  statement  in the House of Commons on the 30th of March 2017. Retrieved 9 April 2017 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-davis-commons-statement-on-the-great-repeal-bill-
white-paper 
162 Hermes, E., op. cit. 154.  
163 Kerr, A. (2017). Scottish Government 'will block Brexit bill power grab'. Retrieved 9 April 2017 at 
https://stv.tv/news/politics/1384421-scottish-government-will-block-brexit-bill-power-grab/ 
164 Roberts,  D.,  Bowcott,  O.  and  O’Carroll,  L.   (2017). ‘Great  Repeal  Bill’  offers   little  detail  and  even  
less security. Retrieved 9 April 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/30/great-repeal-
bill-offers-little-detail-and-even-less-security 
165 Ibid.  
166 UK Government, op. cit. 127.  
167  Sarmiento, D. (2017). The Great Repeal Bill and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – not a 
promising start. Retrieved 9 April 2017 at http://verfassungsblog.de/the-great-repeal-bill-and-the-
charter-of-fundamental-rights-not-a-promising-start/ 
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Additionally, David Davis announced that Britain would resolve disputes over EU 
law on Britain's statute books by   referring   to  ECJ   case   law.   ‘Our intention is not to 
fossilise past decisions of the European  Court   of   Justice   (ECJ)’, he says.168 In other 
words, after Brexit ECJ rulings would have the same status as the UK Supreme Court 
decisions, which can be overturned by subsequent rulings. But the Bill would not give 
the  European  Court  of  Justice  a  ‘future  role’ in the interpretation of UK laws and the 
UK courts will not be obliged to consider cases decided by the ECJ, thus ending the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice after the official separation.169 
 
At this time, the UK Government has its work related to the Bill done. Now it will 
need to build a constructive dialogue with Parliament, giving further assurances that 
new powers will not be abused. But anti-Brexit campaigners are increasingly confident 
that they can stop the law going through after the Conservatives lost their majority in 
the  last  general  election.  ‘The  Great  Repeal  Bill  is  facing  a  long,  hard  battle  and  I  plan  
to fight the Tories every step of the way’, announced the Liberal Democrat leader Tim 
Farron after the election.170  
 
3.3.3 Politics 
 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, both of which voted to stay in the Union, are 
reconsidering their position as part of the United Kingdom. Moreover, Gibraltar raised 
its concerns after Theresa   May’s   failure   to   mention   ‘the   rock’ in her letter to the 
President Donald Tusk.  
 
The first referendum on Scottish independence was held in September 2014, with 
a total result of 55.3% against the proposal. 171  One of the reasons cited by those 
opposing to the Scottish independence was that it would risk the permanence of 
Scotland in the European Union.172 The Scottish National Party (SNP), supporting the 
Scottish independence, stated in its manifesto for the Scottish Parliament election of 
May 2016173 that it would consider holding a second independence referendum if there 
was a substantial change of circumstances after the referendum on the UK membership 
on the European Union.174As   previously   mentioned,   the   ‘Leave’ side won the June 
2016 referendum with 52% of the total vote, but in Scotland 62% of votes were to 
remain in the EU.175  
                                                         
168 David Davis’  statement,  op. cit. 161. 
169 UK Government, op. cit. 127.  
170 Bleckford, M. and Owen, G. (2017). We’ll   block   the   crucial   Great   Repeal   Bill:   Remain   backers  
believe they can defeat the flagship Brexit Bill because the Government is now so weak. Retrieved 13 
June 2017 at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4592360/Remain-backers-ll-block-crucial-Great-
Repeal-Bill.html 
171  BBC News (2014). Scotland votes no. Retrieved 9 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results 
172 Ediburgh News (2014). Scottish independence: 10 reasons for Yes and No. Retrieved 9 April 2017 at 
http://www.edinburghnews.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-independence-10-reasons-for-yes-and-
no-1-3542968 
173 SNP (2016). Manifesto 2016. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at https://www.snp.org/manifesto 
174 Ibid.  
175 Op. cit. 61.  
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Since then it has been a strong debate about whether holding such second Scottish 
independence referendum or if there would be any possibility for Scotland to maintain 
links with the European Union after the United Kingdom leaves the bloc. On the 16th 
of March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May said  that  ‘now  is  not  the  time’ to discuss 
another referendum, because the main point of the relationship between England and 
Scotland  should  be  ‘working  together,  not  pulling  apart’ for Brexit negotiations.176  
 
Scottish  First  Minister  and  leader  of  the  SNP  Nicola  Sturgeon  ignored  May’s  view  
and announced that she  would   seek  Scottish  Parliament’s   approval   to   negotiate  with  
the UK Government for a Section 30 order 177  enabling a second independence 
referendum in late 2018 or early 2019, ‘when the shape of the UK's Brexit deal will 
become  clear’.178  
 
The Scottish Parliament effectively voted in favour of holding the referendum by 
69 to 59,179 but the Government in Westminster must also give its approval to it. That 
is why Sturgeon wrote to Prime Minister Theresa May in the end of March 2017 
formally  demanding  ‘to begin early discussions between our governments to agree an 
Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 that would enable a referendum to be 
legislated for by the Scottish   Parliament’. 180  But the request was declined, as the 
Conservative Manifesto for the 2017 general election clearly provided that, if the 
Conservatives win the general election, they would block a second independence 
referendum unless there  is  ‘public  consent’ for rerun.181  
 
As the general election results came out, Nicola Sturgeon hinted that a second 
Scottish referendum could be shelved after 21 Nationalist MPs lost their seats since 
2015.182  The   First   Minister   said   she   would   ‘reflect   carefully   on   the   result’   as   she  
acknowledged  that  the  SNP’s  support  for  independence  had  cost  them  votes. 
 
In the case of Northern Ireland, this territory is unable to survive on its own. 
Traditionally it has been the region that receives more public money in the United 
Kingdom,183 so a Scottish-style consultation for independence is not viable. Yet there 
have been increasing calls for Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and 
                                                        
176 BBC News (2017). Scottish independence: Referendum demand 'will be rejected'. Retrieved 10 April 
2017 at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-39293513 
177 A Section 30 order is the formal mechanism by which the UK Government would temporarily hand 
power to the Scottish Assembly to organise a referendum. 
178 Scottish Government (2017). Scotland must have choice over future. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at 
https://news.gov.scot/news/scotland-must-have-choice-over-future 
179  BBC News (2017). Scottish Parliament backs referendum call. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-39422747 
180  BBC News (2017). Sturgeon signs independence vote request. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-39449459 
181 Conservative and Unionist Party, op. cit. 134.  
182 Carrell, S. (2017). Nicola Sturgeon hints independence off agenda after SNP loses seats. Retrieved 
11 June 2017 at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/nicola-sturgeon-hints-independence-
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183 BBC News (2011). Northern Ireland receives most public money per head in UK. Retrieved 10 April 
2017 at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-14845296 
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reunite, after 96 years of partition, with the Republic of Ireland.184 The Good Friday 
Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement)185 guarantees a path to reunification 
through a referendum whereby a majority of Northern Irish citizens must vote to leave 
the United Kingdom and join the Republic of Ireland.186 
 
Put simply, if polls show support for a referendum on the Irish reunification then 
the Good Friday Agreement stipulates that the UK Government is legally obliged to 
offer one.187 And in the event that the majority of voters in Northern Ireland wanted to 
remain in the European Union, Northern Ireland would get unified with the Republic 
of Ireland and both would remain in the Union as a united Ireland, unlike Scotland that 
would have to apply for membership of the bloc if the country votes for independence 
because it has never been a member of the European Union on its own.  
 
When it comes to Gibraltar, the territory which Spain has been reclaiming almost 
since it was ceded to Britain in 1713, 96% of the voters agreed to remain in the 
European Union in June 2016.188 After Theresa May formally triggered Article 50, the 
European Council President Donald Tusk sent a nine-page draft document to the EU 
Member States outlining negotiating guidelines for the upcoming Brexit talks. The 
paper conferred Spain the possibility to exclude Gibraltar from any UK-EU 
transitional single market access arrangement or future trade deal if it is not satisfied 
with the status of the territory. It also set out that   once   the  UK   leaves   the   bloc   ‘no 
agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom may apply to the territory of 
Gibraltar without the agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United 
Kingdom’,189 effectively signalling a lack of total British sovereignty over Gibraltar.  
 
‘This unnecessary, unjustified and unacceptable discriminatory proposed singling 
out of Gibraltar and its people was the predictable machination of Spain that the 
people of Gibraltar foresaw and one of the reasons why we voted so massively to 
remain   in   the   EU’, 190  said   the   Gibraltar’s   Chief   Minister   Fabian   Picardo. Picardo 
emphasized  that  the  Gibraltar’s  Government would fiercely oppose any Spanish moves 
to use Brexit negotiations as a means to gain more control over the territory:   ‘Our  
sovereignty  is  not  in  play’.191 
 
3.3.4 Institutions  
                                                         
184 Humphries, C. and Ferguson, A. (2016). How Brexit has suddenly made the prospect of a united 
Ireland thinkable. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-
what-it-means-for-northern-ireland-united-eu-referendum-result-irish-passport-a7117166.html 
185 It is an agreement reached in 1998 on Good Friday (the first day of the Christian Easter Holiday) 
between the political parties of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic to end 30 years of violence 
between catholic and protestant groups.   
186  UK Government (1998). The Belfast Agreement. Retrieved 10 April 2017 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement 
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188 Op. cit. 63.  
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Britain   is   the   EU’s   third   Member   State   with   more   population,   amounting   to  
12.76%  of  the  EU’s  overall  population.192 This means that the United Kingdom is an 
influential player in the European Parliament and in the Council of the European 
Union.  
 
Since the United Kingdom announced that it is going to leave the European 
Union,  one   issue   for  the  bloc  to  resolve   is   the   implications  of   the  UK’s  departure  for  
the European Parliament. Currently, 73 MEPs are elected in the United Kingdom,193 
but this country is likely to have left the Union by the time of the next European 
elections in 2019. This has raised the concerns of whether these 73 UK seats should be 
dropped or reallocated to the rest of the 27 Member States.194 And if they are to be 
reallocated, how would it be done? 
 
The simplest option would be reducing   the   number  of  MEPs  by   73.   ‘After all, 
the UK will have left the EU, the EU budget will have shrunk and parliamentarians 
cost taxpayers money. We calculate that the cost per MEP to the taxpayer is 
€554,881   per   year’, note the experts of Bruegel Robert Kalcik and Guntram B. 
Wolf.195 The European Parliament would therefore be reduced to 678 MEPs.  
 
A second option would be distributing the 73 seats to all the remaining countries 
without exceeding the constraint of a national maximum of 96 established in Article 
14(2) of the Treaty on the European Union. However, this approach would 
dramatically increase the inequality of representation, which has already said to be a 
problem in the current composition of the European Parliament.196  
 
The  UK’s   departure  will   also   impact   the   relative   voting   power  of   the   remaining  
members of the European Council. The  Council’s  voting  system   follows   the   ‘double  
majority’  rule  since  the 1st of November 2014: for a proposal to pass, approval by 55% 
of the Member States is required, which at the same time must represent 65% of the 
population of the EU. This rule is nowadays set in Article 16(4) of the Treaty on the 
European Union. Then if a country leaves the bloc, the share of any other country both 
regarding the number of states and the number of citizens will increase. Similarly, if a 
new country joins the Union, then all the other Member States should lose power as a 
result of transferring a part of their power to the new Member. 
 
Nonetheless, as Werner  Kirsch  highlighted,  ‘this is not true in general nor is it the 
case for the Brexit in particular…  the pending departure will most likely lead to 1) the 
smaller but more numerous EU countries losing rather than gaining power, and 2) if 
                                                        
192 Retrieved 13 April 2017 at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en 
193 Retrieved 13 April 2017 at http://www.europarl.org.uk/en/uk-meps/your-members-in-the-european-
parliament 
194 Kalcik, R. and Wolf, G. B. (2017). Is Brexit an opportunity to reform the European Parliament? 
Retrieved 12 April 2017 at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PC-2017_02-Euro-Parl-
310117.pdf 
195 Ibid.  
196 Véron,   N.   (2014).   How   unequal   is   the   European   Parliament’s   representation?   Retrieved   13   April  
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Scotland joins the EU at a later point in time, it would only add to  the   larger   states’  
strength’.197 
 
Furthermore, it can be said  that  ‘pushing  trade  liberalisation’ has been one of the 
UK’s  main  contributions  to  the EU due to the voting pattern that Britain has adopted in 
the Council up to date. 198  According to Stephen Wall, a former UK Permanent 
Representative to Brussels, in the long term Brexit could increase EU protectionism, as 
‘the strength of potentially protectionist   Member   States   would   grow’.199 In fact, an 
Open Europe analysis of Council voting patterns 200  noted that both the Southern 
protectionist bloc (including France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus) and 
the Northern liberal bloc (including the UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Finland and the Baltics) may hold a blocking minority under the 
Council’s  current  voting  system.201 Without the United Kingdom, the collective weight 
of the liberal bloc would therefore decline, whereas the protectionist bloc would get 
strengthened.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Since the beginning of its membership in the European Union, Britain has held a 
special status, achieving beneficial measures like the UK rebate to reduce the United 
Kingdom's contribution to the Community budget, and opting out those that it 
considered as not favourable, such as the single currency and the Schengen borderless 
area. Nonetheless, its traditional reluctance against the EU integration project has been 
evident all over the years. With two referendums on the membership on the bloc, more 
than any other country in the European Union, Britain finally decided to leave the 
Union in June 2016.  
 
Brexit begun and has carried out its way with no minor controversies, such as the 
interpretation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty given that the constitution in Britain is 
unwritten, the concerns of the so-called Henry VIII clauses regarding the Great Repeal 
Bill, the willingness of Scotland and Northern Ireland to reconsider their territories as 
part   of   the  United  Kingdom,  Gibraltar’s   sovereignty   dispute, the unexpected loss of 
Conservatives’  parliamentary  majority  after the UK general election in June 2017…   
 
Up to now, there is a lot of uncertainty concerning Brexit effects. When it comes 
to the economy, experts have noted that it seems unlikely to have a final UK-EU free 
trade deal by March 2019, and the Bank of England has written hundreds of banks,                                                         
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20EU.pdf 
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April 2017 at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/europe/briefing-papers/Briefing-paper-2 
199 Ibid.  
200  Booth, S., Howarth, C., Persson, M., Ruparel, R. and Swidlicki, P. (2015). What if...? The 
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insurers and financial firms warning them to have their contingency plans prepared for 
the full range of possible scenarios, especially now that the  UK’s  economy  growth   is 
slowing due to the higher inflation. In a plausible one, the biggest legal impact 
intended by the UK Government would be transferring the whole of EU law on to the 
UK statute book as soon as the United Kingdom leaves the Union under the 
controversial Great Repeal Bill. Less probable is the fact that Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, both of which voted to remain in the EU, could separate from the United 
Kingdom.  
 
In what there is common agreement is that the UK Government pretended a hard 
Brexit that has been recently challenged by the result of the last UK general election in 
favour of a softer one, as the DUP does not consider leaving the single market due to 
the important trade relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Moreover, all studies acknowledge that, in whatever form Brexit may adopt, the losses 
will be considerably larger for the United Kingdom than for the other 27 remaining 
Members of the Union. Aware of this, some UK entities have already confirmed the 
transfer of part of their activities abroad and banks, insurers and financial firms are 
preparing contingency plans for the full range of possible scenarios.  
 
From the point of view of the European Union, there is no doubt that Brexit will 
also mark a before and after, not only in the membership of the Union but in the 
traditional functioning of its institutions, especially concerning the issues of the 
distribution of the 73 UK seats of the European Parliament and the relative voting 
power of the European Council. Having the UK-EU negotiations started on the 19th 
June, the bloc has its red lines well defined, opposing to a UK-EU economic 
relationship based on sector-specific deals and to the division of the four freedoms of 
the single market.  
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